India’s liberalising economy is creating a marked shift in its political culture

Even as India’s growth story marches on unabated, policy makers continue to struggle with the modalities of how to address the needs of the poorest sections of society, especially communities living in rural areas. As debates on how to measure poverty, the country’s runaway inflation, etc., fly fast and furious, the epicenter of debates over “inclusive growth” remains the “land question”. The issue of land acquisition has a long and checkered history in India. Over the past few decades, the corporate sector has found itself at the receiving end in discussions about land rights of the marginal and poor sections of the population. This pattern has been dramatically punctuated through many government decisions, the most visible being the rejection of Vedanta’s mining plans in the Niyamgiri Hills last year, and in a different context, the Tatas’ misadventures in West Bengal over the Nano plant. At the heart of such cases is the tug-of-war between corporate interests seeking to maximise returns and the livelihood aspirations of social groups, described variously as Adivasi, Dalit, tribal, etc. The socio-cultural values of these communities are spatially bounded by land, often interwoven with their economies and ecosystems. Further exacerbating the sense of mistrust between big industry and indigenous communities has been the rise of Left-wing extremism in the central Indian tribal heartland. In all of this, the changing character of the Indian state has been a key variable and has shaped the vagaries of the “land question”. In 50 years, India has moved from the age of Nehruvian institutions that were products of a top-down planning paradigm, to a phase in which the language of “bottom-up” planning and economic liberalisation has led to key legislations that empower “local bodies”. Described as panchayats, gram sabhas, or for the urban areas, municipal bodies, these are being brought into the mainstream discussions of India’s natural resources, land, water, etc.This paradigm adjustment (it’s too soon to call it a paradigm shift) has put the state under pressure in ways that it had not experienced earlier. The top-heavy political order of the Nehruvian years — with state-led planned development negotiated by what Rajni Kothari called the “Congress System” has — via the Indira and Rajiv Gandhi years, given way to the recognition that Indian society is entering the phase of “bottom-up democracy” with a mobile “middle”. In the past two decades, this newly emerging political configuration has manifested itself in several ways, from the growing role of civil society organisations in shaping legislations (e.g., the Right to Information campaign), to the passage of the 73rd and 74th Amendments (1992), the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA) 1996, and the Forest Rights Act (FRA) 2008. It has also led to the growing power of Dalit and Adivasi politics. These developments, in the larger context of India’s liberalising economy, signal a marked shift in India’s democratic culture, which will again be tested when the Parliament debates Jairam Ramesh’s Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill (LARR). Cynics would perhaps lament these developments as populist gestures, but it would be a mistake — the genie is out of the bottle. As we look to the future, it is vital that India’s institutional apparatus finds ways to engage local bodies and communities in a systematic, meaningful manner. The legislations referred to above highlight the fact that India’s grassroots democratic forms have been formalised and institutionalised in an accelerated fashion over the past two decades. This is entirely in the fitness of things, as India’s diverse and still predominantly rural population makes its presence felt in the political mainstream. Of course, this has created serious challenges of governance, as the growing tensions over land and mining rights in virtually all parts of the country demonstrate. The primary reason for this is that those directly impacted by legislations like PESA and FRA, i.e., those who wish to acquire land (who are largely in the private sector), and those who currently occupy it, are still uncertain about the full implications of these Acts. This requires urgent attention. The sense of mutual mistrust between these two groups, compounded by the inadequacy of governmental facilitation on these matters, underscores the need for the creation of space for meaningful engagement between all concerned. Such a deliberation must address, firstly, the operational contours of the legislative frameworks provided by the 73rd and 74th Amendments, PESA, and the FRA. Secondly, it should evolve a shared understanding that inclusive development and inclusive growth can go hand in hand when the people being displaced from their land and environment are given some agency in shaping their future, perhaps even a stake in any new enterprise. Last, but not the least, such a dialogue can also serve to de-mystify the challenges that the state and big industry face in a globalising economy. (To illustrate this point, one could perhaps imagine a scenario in which organisations like FICCI and CII engage directly with representatives of groups who fear displacement and marginalisation due to the mining cartels. If necessary, neutral civil society groups or government representatives may be invited to facilitate such a dialogue.) Such a space is necessary for the fullest realisation of what anthropologist Arjun Appadurai describes as “deep democracy”. For India’s growth story to have any real legitimacy for the majority of its citizens, dominant groups in the political and corporate classes must forge meaningful alliances with the people living in urban neighbourhoods, towns and villages. The majority of Indians are in the throes of a tectonic shift as their economies transform from being unorganised to organised; and local to global (via regional and national hubs mushrooming all over). Dominant groups must recognise that they need to listen, and learn to engage with people active at the grassroots level; indeed, with regard to the “land question” no one should have choice in the matter since such engagement is the law of the land. This recognition should be built on an abiding respect for the kinds of laws currently enshrined in India’s Constitution, i.e., PESA and FRA, which are built on the principle that the challenges of inclusive development will require the direct participation of local bodies, through which the majority of India’s people express themselves politically.