Will this General Elections curve a different path?
HOW TIME FLIES. On May 27, 1964, Jawaharlal Nehru passed away. It is difficult for today’s Indians, used to fast-paced events and frenetic news cycles, running from one blockbuster happening to another, to imagine what the death of the great man meant for Indians of the time. For all his faults and despite the then-recent humiliation at the hands of China, Nehru was much cherished and seen as a pan-Indian patriarch. His death ended an era, and triggered a genuine national mourning.
Why is this relevant today, in a hard and bitter election season as India prepares to vote for the 16th Lok Sabha? It is being mentioned for a strange, piquant coincidence that will mark not just a conjunction of dates but a larger closure. In May this year, a few days before Nehru’s 50th death anniversary perhaps, India will see a new prime minister come into office. Opinion polls suggest this new prime minister will not be from the Congress, or at least that incarnation of the Congress run by Nehru’s family after his departure. Fifty years after Nehru, the political dynasty that still rules the Congress in his name faces its most compelling existential crisis. India has seen two dramatic rejections of the dynasty, in 1977 and 1989. The Congress defeats of the 1990s don’t quite count because the party wasn’t led by a Nehru-Gandhi at that point (except in 1999) and there had not been a Nehru-Gandhi in power or wielding executive authority since Rajiv Gandhi demitted office in 1989. If the opinion polls are right, then 2014 will turn out to be as much of a watershed as 1977 or 1989, maybe greater.
Why? The UPA government has been around for a decade. Sonia and Rahul Gandhi have been the faces of the establishment—though they have not formally served in government— and are indelibly associated with the UPA. As such, an anti-incumbency vote against the UPA and a harsh sentiment against a system of privilege and Nehru-Gandhi authority cannot be divorced. It is no longer easy to pretend people are angry with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, but are neutral or even sympathetic towards the Congress president and vice-president.
The impending defeat will call into question the viability of the Nehru- Gandhi dynasty as a political and electoral brand. Dissidents did leave the Congress in both 1977 and 1989. Indira Gandhi in fact had to split the party after that post-Emergency defeat. However, a vast number of loyalists and an all-India political network stayed true to her. Her son, Sanjay Gandhi, built on this with a new street-fighter energy from the admittedly thuggish Youth Congress of the 1970s. In 1989, the coalition era hadn’t quite dawned and many in the Congress thought Rajiv Gandhi would be back in office sooner or later. In any case, the Congress remained the largest party by a mile.
In all this, 2014 threatens to be different. There is little faith in Rahul Gandhi emerging as a decisive, clearheaded political show-stopper who will electrify the public. His political acumen and electoral strategies are politely described as “idealistic” and “long-term”. Privately they have Congress functionaries tearing their hair. If the Congress indeed drops down to below 100 seats (as recent polls says), then recovery in the next election would mean a target of 125- 135 seats, far from the 206 the party won in 2009 and even further from the single-party majority its oldtimers still dream of. Quick fixes, like replacing Rahul with his sister on the basis of the specious belief that she is “more of a people’s person”, will hardly solve the larger problem. What is more likely is a fundamental restructuring of power equations within the Congress. Any state-level stalwart who emerges in a post-2014 situation will either do so outside the Congress umbrella or will demand a heavy price for identifying with the Congress. He or she will dictate terms to Delhi. To give a real-life example, if Y.S. Rajashekhara Reddy were to have died after the coming 2014 election—rather than after the 2009 election—the Nehru-Gandhis would have found it much more difficult to deny his son, Y.S. Jaganmohan Reddy, an immediate shot at the chief ministry of Andhra Pradesh.
Apart from internal collapse, the Congress is also encountering a singularly determined opponent. The party has faced challenges before – from the Swatantra Party to the old Jan Sangh, from the socialists to the Janata Party to, of course, regional parties. These parties have had a limited geographical or demographic footprint. Alternatively, they have just been short-lived. Also many (but not all) of them were led by those who had been influenced by the political culture of Delhi, constructed substantially by the Congress and its family leadership.
The BJP under Narendra Modi differs from this old model on two counts. One, having run Gujarat for 12 years, Modi represents not just an alternative tradition in politics but also an alternative tradition in governance. He would be keener than previous non-Congress politicians to distinguish and product-differentiate himself from the prevailing Delhi framework. Two, Modi and his contemporaries in the BJP—including strong chief ministers who have made the Congress less competitive in several big states—are part of a second generation in the BJP. This is the first all-India, non-Congress party that has effected a renewal and built on—rather than frittered away—the achievements of its foundational leadership. Unlike many other Congress adversaries, it has not disappeared after the retirement or passing of one or two charismatic leaders. All of these are harsh realities for the Congress to deal with. On May 27, 1964, millions of Indians wept for Nehru. In May 2014, children and grandchildren of many of those very Indians will be glad to be rid of the Congress and its dynasts. History would have turned a page; India would have moved on.